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The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for
Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held
Corporation Trap
JAMES M. VAN VLIET JR. & MARK

D. SNIDER*

Over the years, in a growing number of states where the courts have
considered the matter, shareholders in at least certain types of closely held
corporations have been held to owe a partner-like fiduciary duty to each
other.' This judicially developed rule expands the ability of the courts to
provide relief for shareholders caught in a closely held corporation "trap,"
i.e., a situation that has developed that is unacceptable to a shareholder who
lacks the voting power to force a change and has neither a statutory nor
contractual right to relief. The purpose of this article is to review the
development of the rule, identifying its theoretical basis and its general
scope and content, as well as some issues that still need to be decided in the
course of the further development of the rule.
I. THE ILLINOIS AND DELAWARE DEVELOPMENTS
Although the shareholder-fiduciary rule appears to be the best solution
yet developed for the "trap" problem, its progress has been uncertain and
incomplete, as might be expected for a rule evolving by the case decision
process. This is forcefully demonstrated by the experience in Illinois and
Delaware.
In 1990, in Hagshenas v. Gaylord, an Illinois appellate court held that
a fifty percent shareholder in a closely held Illinois corporation, which in
effect was an incorporated partnership, "owed a fiduciary duty similar to a
partner to [the corporation] and its shareholders." 2 That is, all shareholders,
not just controlling shareholders, in "incorporated partnerships" owe the
heightened fiduciary duty of a partner. That duty, in this particular case,

* Mr. Van Vliet is a retired partner and Mr. Snider is a partner in the Chicago law
firm of Schiff Hardin & Waite.
1. As courts gain an appreciation of the need for special rules for closely held
corporations because of their special nature, they generally adopt the rule that shareholders
in such corporations have a partner-like fiduciary duty, and (when needed) overrule or evade
any prior decisions that might call for a contrary result. See, e.g., Fought v. Morris, 543
So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989).
2. 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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was applied to forbid a shareholder, who had resigned from all management
and employment positions, from competing with the corporation so long as
his share ownership continued. Authorities cited in the decision indicate
that this partner-like fiduciary duty previously had been the rule in Illinois,4
but Hagshenas is the first holding to that effect under the state's law,
placing Illinois squarely among the forefront of the growing number of
states that apply this fiduciary concept to aid shareholders caught in a
closely held corporation trap.
The rule in Hagshenas has been followed in several subsequent

decisions applying Illinois law.5 However, in Dowell v. Bitner, an Illinois

appellate court for another district, while purporting to follow Hagshenas,

reached an opposite result by holding that the fiduciary duty of a sharehold-

er in a closely held Illinois corporation depends on "something more than
mere status as a shareholder" and might depend on the "shareholder's ability
to hinder, influence, or control the corporation," rather than the partnershiplike nature of the corporation. 6 This split of authority at the appellate court
3. To the same effect was an earlier Massachusetts decision involving a corporation
owned fifty-fifty by two brothers, in which one brother was barred from competing with the
corporation until he severed "his relationship as officer, director and equal shareholder."
Cain v. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650, 656 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (emphasis added).
4. Although the cases cited in Hagshenas indicated that Illinois would, in an
appropriate case, rule in favor of the shareholder-fiduciary rule, there also are Illinois cases
which suggested a possible opposite result. For example, a former officer and employee of
a closely held Illinois corporation was not barred from competing with the corporation even
though he continued to own thirty-five percent of the corporation's shares. Ellis and
Marshall Associates, Inc. v. Marshall, 306 N.E.2d 712 (I11.App. Ct. 1974). This result
apparently was due to a failure to argue to the court that share ownership in a closely held
corporation carried with it a fiduciary duty not to compete. In another case, competition with
a closely held corporation was held to violate the fiduciary duty owed by the person as a
director and officer, but no mention was made of a breach of fiduciary duty owed as a
shareholder, even though the competing person owned fifty percent of the closely held
corporation's shares. Smith-Shrader Co., Inc. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995); Dearborn
Process Service, Inc. v. Storner, 149 B.R. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); Ruca Hardware, Ltd.
v. Chien, 1994 WL 548196 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1994), on reconsideration, 1995 WL 307172
(N.D. 11. May 17, 1995); cf. Sebastian v. Zuromski, 1993 WL 78713 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18,
1993).
6. 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (I11.App. Ct. 1995). The idea that Hagshenas imposes a
fiduciary duty on a shareholder only if the shareholder has some control capability in a
particular matter is derived from the mention in that decision that "by maintaining his 50%
[stock] ownership interest, however, [Mr. Hagshenas] retained significant control over
Imperial" which he kept notwithstanding his resignation from offices and employment.
Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). However, there was no
issue before the court that involved such control, making it appear unlikely that this
discussion should negate having the shareholder fiduciary duty arise out of the analogy to a
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level has yet to be resolved by an Illinois Supreme Court decision.
In the published works of local commentators, the Hagshenasdecision
has been more criticized than praised.7 The Illinois State Bar Association
carried forward the attack, recommending legislation to "overrule" the
Hagshenas decision.8 This effort became House Bill 700 in the Eightyeighth General Assembly of the State of Illinois, which sought to amend
§6.4 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 19839 to add the following
provision: "A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation who does

not control or participate in the management of that corporation has no
fiduciary duty to that corporation or its shareholders." While the concept in
House Bill 700 appears to have been judicially adopted in the Dowell
decision, the proposal to legislatively overrule Hagshenas failed to pass,
thereby blocking (or at least delaying) a statutory amendment that would be
regressive and misdirected, as well as being drafted in a manner that ignores
the intricacies of the problem, generating issues of interpretation and
application.'0 That the Hagshenas decision is within the mainstream of the
development in the United States of the shareholder-fiduciary concept for
closely held corporations cannot be doubted, as the case decisions discussed
later in this article demonstrate. House Bill 700 would have repealed what
was valuable in Hagshenas, while ignoring the real problem-and a long
standing one-which is special to closely held corporations. That problem

partnership. Nevertheless, the quoted language and the Dowell decision leave this to be
resolved.
7. See 7 CHARLES W. MURDOCK, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS SECTION 10.4, 579
(1996) (stating with respect to Hagshenas: "It is hard to conceive of a more fundamentally
unsound opinion."). See also John T. Doyle, From the Chairman,41 ISBA CORP., SEC. &
Bus. L. F. 1 (Jan. 1996); William Lynch Schaller, Competing After Leaving: Fiduciary
Duties of Closely Held CorporationShareholdersAfter Hagshenasv. Gaylord, 84 ILL. B. J.
354 (1996); Gene A. Petersen, Hagshenasv. Gaylord update, 38 ISBA CORP., SEC. & Bus.
L. F. 6 (May 1993); Charles W. Murdock, When do fiduciary duties end?, 36 ISBA CORP.,
SEC. & Bus. L. F. 1 (Jan. 1991).
8. James J. Moylan, Report on the activities of the Illinois State Bar Association's
Corporation and Securities Law Section Council, 38 ISBA CORP., SEC. & Bus. L. F. 10
(March 1993).
9. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6.40 (West 1983).
10. See GENE A. PETERSON & ANGELA K. GARRET, FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS
SETTINGS, INCORPORATE LAW - NEW DEVELOPMENTS INSHAREHOLDER FIDUCIARY DUTIES
AND NEW STATUTORY SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION REMEDIES at 37-40; And Thomas J.
Bamonte, Expanding the FiduciaryDuties of Close CorporationShareholders: The Dilemma
Facing Illinois Corporate Law, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 257, 262, n. 28 (1995) (referring to
conflicts of views among the Illinois Secretary of State's Corporation Acts Advisory
Committee and committees of the Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations which apparently
caused, or at least contributed to, the failure of House Bill 700).
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is the lack of relief, available quickly and with certainty, for any shareholder
trapped in a closely held corporation situation, for whatever reason, with no
way out under existing statutes."
In sharp contrast to the Hagshenas decision in Illinois is the Delaware
decision in Nixon v. Blackwell. 2 The trial court had granted relief to nonemployee shareholders of a closely held Delaware corporation who
complained of not being treated proportionately in comparison to financial
benefits provided to shareholders who were employees of the corporation. 3
The trial court's action opened the possibility of another significant advance
in the development of the shareholder-fiduciary concept for closely held
corporations. However, the Delaware Supreme Court, in emphatically
overturning the trial court's decision, said that it "would be inappropriate
judicial legislation for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule
for minority investors."' 4 Thus, Delaware adopted what is now the
minority view in the United States.
II. NEED FOR THE FIDUCIARY DUTY SOLUTION
The shareholders' trap in closely held corporations is obvious. As
already noted herein, because shareholders lack a ready market for their
shares, when internal problems arise all but the controlling shareholders (and
sometimes even they) may have to rely upon special charter provisions or
contractual rights either to resolve the problem or to liquidate their
shareholdings, when the other shareholders will not cooperate in achieving
either result. If there is no special charter provision or contract that can be
relied upon, a shareholder may be forced to look to statutory remedies,

11. A much earlier description of the problem is as follows:
Only in the close corporation does the power to manage carry with it the de facto
power to allocate the benefits of ownership arbitrarily among the shareholders and
to discriminate against a minority whose investment is imprisoned in the enterprise.
The essential basis of this power in the close corporation is the inability of those
so excluded from the benefits of proprietorship to withdraw their investment at
will. The power to withdraw one's capital from a publicly held corporation or
from a partnership is unqualified in the sense that the participant's right is not
dependent upon misconduct by the management or the occurrence of any other
event.
J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics,Problems, andNeeds of the Close Corporation,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 21. See also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E. 2d 551, 557 (N.C.
1983) for a detailed, sympathetic discussion of the needs related to the special nature of
closely held corporations.
12. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
13. Blackwell v. Nixon, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 1991).
14. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d at 1380-81 (Del. 1993).
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which all too often by their terms either are not available or are not
adequate, 5 or require court proceedings that are too expensive in terms of
cost or time, or both, to be a practical solution. In other words, shareholders
can be trapped in a situation that they want to fix or leave, but can't do
either unless a remedy can be obtained under the shareholder-fiduciary rule.
Obviously, the best solution for the shareholders' trap is to have a
special charter provision or contract among the shareholders and the
corporation, made in advance, that provides a means for relief for individual
shareholders when the need arises, and with such certainty that litigation will
be avoided. The rule in Hagshenas certainly does not abate the need for
such a charter provision or contract in every closely held corporation
because under the shareholder-fiduciary rule relief depends upon fault of
another party and is not available for a minority or equal shareholder who
simply wants to liquidate his or her investment, when there is no breach of
duty or other fault on the part of any other party. However, when there is
no charter provision or contract, or there is one but it is not valid 6 or does
not cover the particular situation, -the judicially-developed shareholderfiduciary concept may be the best available means to relief. Further, even
when the statutory laws apply which provide for relief in the case of
.corporate deadlock, shareholders' dissension, or shareholder oppression, the
fiduciary duty concept may be a better alternative because it permits relief
to be tailored to the circumstances, rather than to conform only to what is
authorized by such statutes.

15. The Hagshenas decision illustrates the point. A fifty-fifty deadlock existed but
relief under statutory provisions allowing dissolution in the court's discretion, as a remedy
for deadlock, was not granted for this apparently hopelessly divided travel agency
corporation. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
16. For those corporations that elect "close corporation" status under the Illinois
Business Corporation Act of 1983, the statute provides that "[t]he articles of incorporation
... may include a provision granting to any shareholder, or to the holders of any specified
number or percentage of shares of any class, an option to have the corporation dissolved at
will or upon the occurrence of any specified event or contingency." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2A.50 (West 1983). The inclusion of such a provision in the infrequently used
residue of what initially was the Close Corporation Act of Illinois arguably implies that
closely held corporations which do not elect close corporation status under the statute may
not be allowed to have such dissolution provisions in their charters. See, e.g., the preemption
discussion in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d at 1380-81. While one could wonder what
legitimate interest the state would have in forcing such an apparently senseless result, will
the question as to the validity of such provisions deter closely held corporations that do not
elect close corporation status under the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 from
adopting dissolution rights equivalent to what is available for partnerships or, if adopted,
make it risky for the shareholders to rely upon such a provision as their means to relief?
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III. THE HAGSHENAS CASE ILLUSTRATES THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RULE
To SERVE A NEED

In Hagshenas,two married couples, the Hagshenas and the Gaylords,
purchased an Illinois corporation engaged in the travel agency business.
The four persons became the officers and directors of the corporation and
were active in its business.' 7 Share ownership was equally divided
between the two couples, with Mr. Hagshenas owning fifty percent of the
shares and the Gaylords sharing their fifty percent.'"
When dissension between the couples became acute, as it soon did, Mr.
Hagshenas brought suit in April 1982 to dissolve the corporation under the
Illinois statute then in effect, which permitted such relief in the case of
corporate deadlock. The statute provided:
Circuit courts have full power to liquidate the assets and
business of a corporation: (a) In an action by a shareholder when it appears: (1) That the directors are deadlocked
in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that
irreparable injury to the corporation is suffered or threatened by reason thereof. 9
The Gaylords countered with a claim that Mr. Hagshenas had violated the
fiduciary duty which he owed to them."
In October 1982, with the suit pending and day-to-day operations
conducted under a court order restraining the parties from interfering with
each other, Mr. Hagshenas proposed that another travel agency be acquired
so that each couple could conduct business separately.2 This was rejected
by the Gaylords. 2 The next day, Mr. and Mrs. Hagshenas resigned all of
their positions with the corporation and on the day following bought another
travel agency and began competing with the corporation while Mr.
Hagshenas, of course, continued to own half of the corporation's shares.2 3
Five years later, in 1987, the trial court denied Mr. Hagshenas'
complaint for judicial dissolution and ruled in favor of the Gaylords on their

17. 557 N.E.2d 316, 318 (I11.App. Ct. 1990).
18. Id.
19. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1983), ch. 32, 157.86(a), repealed and superceded by the Illinois
Business Corporation Act of 1983, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1.02 (West 1983) (amended
1994): and see infra note 27.
20. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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counter suit, holding that Mr. Hagshenas had breached his fiduciary duty as
a fifty percent shareholder by engaging in competition with the corporation.24 On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.25
The Hagshenas case illustrates several important points. First, even
when the state of incorporation has a remedial statute (in this case
dissolution was authorized as a discretionary remedy for deadlock),2 6 the
statutory criteria for judicial relief for shareholders trapped in closely held
corporations all too frequently cannot be satisfied even though, from a
business perspective, relief is needed.27 Second, the shareholder-fiduciary
duty concept is a classic example of equity developing the means of

24. Id. at 318.
25. Id. at 328.
26. Now found in the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 §12.56, 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 1983) (amended 1994).
27. This may continue to be true under the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983,
in which there has been a relaxation of what is required to be eligible for relief, coupled with
a broadening of the kinds of relief under the Act, without improving rights of shareholders
in closely held corporations to withdraw their investment without need of litigation or
without proof of fault on the part of the corporation or the other shareholders. When the
1983 Act replaced the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933, it carried forward in 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.50 the relief provision in Section 86(a) of the 1933 Act with
modifications that attempted to make dissolution more readily available in a deadlock
situation as follows (with substantive differences from Section 86(a) in the 1933 Act
underscored):
A Circuit Court may dissolve a corporation ... (b) In an action by a
shareholder, if it is established that: (1) The directors are deadlocked ... in the
management of the corporate affairs; the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock; and either irreparable injury to the corporation is thereby caused or
threatened or the business of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
general advantage of the shareholders ....
The 1983 Act also added alternatives to dissolution, namely, appointment of a provisional
director or a custodian or the ordering of "a purchase of the complaining shareholder's
shares." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55(a). In 1995, the 1983 Act was amended to
change these provisions, and make them applicable only to shareholders of Illinois
corporations which have publicly traded shares, and to add 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/12.56 to provide for remedies only for shareholders of non-public Illinois corporations.
This latter change greatly increased the number (to 13) of different remedies which a court
may grant in an action brought by a shareholder of a closely held corporation, ranging from
dissolution to "other legal and equitable remedies which the court may impose." It remains
to be seen whether, under these broadened statutory provisions, the courts will be prone to
experimenting with the judicial management of corporate affairs in an effort to rehabilitate
shareholder "marriages" which have gone sour, continuing to eschew (as has been the general
judicial tradition) the summary termination of such corporations by court-ordered dissolution.
The wording in section 12.56(a)(12) of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 clearly
weighs in favor of such experimentation.
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providing needed relief not available at law and doing so by the traditional
method of extending the application of an existing doctrine (fiduciary duty
of partners) to an analogous factual situation (an incorporated "partnership").2" Third, as could be expected with judicial development of a rule,
important issues concerning the shareholder-fiduciary concept remain for
future decisions. Until then there will be uncertainty as to the application
of the concept, with possible differences state by state. For example,
whether the heightened fiduciary duty applies only to "incorporated
partnerships" (which was the factual situation in Hagshenas) or will be
extended to all closely held corporations (because the need exists in all
closely held corporations) has yet to be determined. Fourth, the time needed
(and probably in most cases the cost) for court proceedings to achieve relief
generally will exceed what is acceptable for business reasons, especially for
the typical small business. If Lord Coke's admonition that "justice delayed
is justice denied"29 is correct, then no one could claim that a 1990 appellate decision in Hagshenas for a 1982 shareholders' problem in a closely
held service business could provide justice. So long as the judicial process
remains in such desperate need of repair and until there is enlightened
legislation providing for relief without litigation and without need of fault
of any party, a shareholders' agreement made in advance will be the best
and probably the only practical solution to a trap problem.
However, when there is no shareholders' agreement or one exists but
is inapplicable to the particular situation, the concept of all shareholders in
a closely held corporation having a fiduciary duty to each other appears to
have as much, if not far more, promise as a solution for trapped shareholders than any statutory provision for relief as yet enacted. Accepting as true
the criticism that shareholders are burdened by the partner-like fiduciary

duty concept, some burden may be the necessary price for what may be the

best-and sometimes only-means to relief for trapped shareholders.
Further, it would seem, as the decided cases sometimes indicate, that the
burden in large part comes not from the fiduciary duty itself, but from the
failure of the shareholder-fiduciary to anticipate the existence and appreciate
the nature of his or her. duty-deficiencies which likely could be overcome
by timely advice of counsel.

28. "[C]ourts in the states with the most restrictive involuntary dissolution statutes
appear to be the most receptive to granting remedies for close corporation intra-corporate
dissension on a breach of fiduciary duty theory." Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of
Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 25, 84 n. 282 (1987).
29. SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND INSTrrUTE 55-56 (4th ed. 1671).
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IV. IN WHAT KIND OF CORPORATIONS DOES THE SHAREHOLDERFIDUCIARY RULE APPLY?

In this article and in the business world, a "closely held corporation"
is simply any corporation which has no trading market for its shares and
typically, but not necessarily, has only a few shareholders. Shareholders in
these corporations cannot escape a disagreeable situation by selling their
shares in the market. Unless they control the corporation, they are mutually
dependent, except in limited situations for which statutory remedies may be
available.
The leading case for the rule that shareholders in at least certain types
of closely held corporations have the same fiduciary duty to the corporation
and the other shareholders as partners have to their partnership and other
partners is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.3" There,
the court referred to the type of closely held corporation for which the
shareholder-fiduciary rule applies as a "close corporation," defined as
follows:
We deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a
small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the
corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management, direction and operations
of the corporation. As thus defined, the close corporation
bears striking resemblance to a partnership. . . . [T]he
close corporation is often little more than an "incorporated" or "chartered" partnership.31
The Illinois view is to the same effect. In Hagshenas, the court said, "In
this case the facts demonstrate that, though Imperial was purchased as a
corporation, it clearly was an enterprise closely resembling a partnership.
Hagshenas and the Gaylords were not only equal 50% shareholders; they

30. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). The Wilkes decision, and related discussion infra
note 63, should be read in conjunction with the Donahue decision because it qualifies the
shareholder-fiduciary rule applied in Donahue. Wilkes permits legitimate business decisions
to be carried out without constituting a violation of the fiduciary duty owed to a complaining
shareholder, unless it can be shown that the end result sought by the business decision could
be achieved by a less damaging alternative. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
31. Id. at 511-12.
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were the directors and officers of the company; they oversaw day-to-day
operations.""
The terminology no doubt breeds confusion. Black's Law Dictionary33 groups a number of not necessarily consistent definitions for a
"close corporation," one of which makes the term synonymous with "closely
held" (i.e., a corporation which has no trading market for its shares), while
others make the term apply only to certain kinds of closely held corporations. To complicate the matter, some states have adopted special statutory
provisions which define a "close corporation" as a closely held corporation
which is eligible to elect, and does elect, close corporation status under the
statute.34 Still another type of "close corporation" arises from the Donahue
and the Hagshenas decisions, where the term is defined as a closely held
corporation in which either all shareholders or the shareholder to be
impressed with the fiduciary duty participates in the management and
operation of the corporation's business. It is this last definition which is
used for the term "close corporation" in this article. Further, it is the feature
of participating in the management and operation of the corporation's
business in those cases that makes the "close corporation" analogous to a
partnership, which analogy becomes the theoretic basis for applying the
shareholder-fiduciary rule to shareholders of such corporations.
The fiduciary duty owed by partners under the common law derived
from the fiduciary duty owed under the law of agency by a servant (agent)
to its master (principal). "[T]he law of partnership reflects the broader law
of principal and agent, under which every agent is a fiduciary."3 5 As
explained by the Illinois Supreme Court: "A partner embraces the character
both of principal and agent. For himself, with respect to the concerns of the
partnership, he virtually acts as principal, and as agent for his partners. 36
The partner's role as agent is analogous to the shareholder's role in the
management of a "close corporation," supporting the application in the latter
situation of a partner-like fiduciary duty to the other shareholders.
However, because of the lack of a trading market for the corporations'
shares, the need for relief may exist in the whole spectrum of closely held

32. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Iil. App. Ct. 1990). Elsewhere, in
the same decision, the court said: "We also find it significant that the shareholders elected
themselves directors and officers and participated in the day-to-day operations." Id. at 322.
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, ch.l, §§ 341-356 (1991); cf 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2A.05 - 5/2A.60 (West 1983).
35. Uniform Partnership Act § 4.04, cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 59 (1994), citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §13 (1957).
36. Raymond v. Vaughn, 21 N.E. 566, 568 (I11.1889).

1998]

THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION TRAP

corporations and not just those that are close corporations as defined in
Donahue and Hagshenas. Will the courts perform their historical function
of extending solutions in equity to satisfy needs left by the inadequacy of
remedies in law? To do so requires modification of the rationale by which
the shareholder-fiduciary concept has been borrowed from partnership law,
possibly by resorting to a theory that the fiduciary duty derives from the
37
mutual dependence of the shareholders in a closely held corporation.
V. ALL SHAREHOLDERS OWE THE FIDUCIARY

DUTY

Factually, the typical shareholder-fiduciary duty case involves a
minority shareholder seeking relief against a controlling shareholder or
shareholder group. The leading case, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of
New England, Inc.3" involves just that: a minority shareholder wanting her
shares purchased by the corporation at the same price the corporation had
paid for some of the controlling shareholder's shares. However, to warn
that a fiduciary duty is owed by all shareholders in those closely held
corporations which fit within the special definition of a "close corporation,"
and not just by the controlling shareholders, the Donahue court, in a
powerful dictum, declared:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close
corporation to the partnership, the trust and confidence
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise,
and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close
corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another. 39 (emphasis added)
The application of the duty to all shareholders, of course, is because the
duty is that of a partner (based on the analogy of a close corporation to a
partnership) and not the different duty owed by a control shareholder to the
other shareholders.40

37. In Illinois, there already has been legislative action differentiating statutory
remedies for shareholders according to whether the corporation's shares are publicly traded
or closely held, indicating a public policy distinction between the two types of corporations.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55 and 5/12.56 (West 1983)(amended 1994).
38. See discussion supra note 30.
39. 328 N.E.2d at 515. In a footnote, the court also said, "We do not limit our holding
to majority stockholders." Id at n.17.
40. See infra part VI.
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The Hagshenas case stands as one of the relatively few decisions that
actually applies the fiduciary duty to a non-controlling shareholder (in this
case a fifty percent shareholder). As previously noted, that decision has
since been followed in other cases in which Illinois law applied, with the
42
Dowell decision as the only divergent ruling in Illinois.4' Evans v. Blesi
is an example of a fiduciary duty being applied to another fifty percent
shareholder in another jurisdiction. Confirmation that, in an appropriate
factual setting, a fiduciary duty is owed by all shareholders, and not just
control shareholders also can be found in decisions in several jurisdictions
which hold that minority shareholders in closely held corporations owe a
fiduciary duty to majority shareholders.43
For those that hold to the view that the fiduciary duty should apply
only to controlling shareholders even in closely held corporations, the
decision in Cafcas v. DeHaan & Richter, P.C.44 is important. It stands for
the proposition that non-controlling shareholders can be an ad hoc control
group, the members of which owe a fiduciary duty when they oppose a
shareholder in a given situation. There is no discussion in this decision to
indicate that the group of shareholders in question had bound themselves to
generally control the closely held corporation. Nevertheless, the court found
that all of the other shareholders, being unified in opposing the plaintiffshareholder on issues relating to the buy-out of his shares, were controlling
shareholders for purposes of having a fiduciary duty to the lone shareholder.45 The court relied upon Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. Harrisas the
precedent for the principle that extends "the fiduciary duties formerly
imposed solely on single controlling shareholders to a group of shareholders
who constituted a majority."' 41 Thus, an ad hoc combining of non-controlling shareholders into a control group for purposes of a particular issue, at
least under Illinois law, can result in a fiduciary duty, based on control,
owed to a minority shareholder by each member of the controlling
shareholder group. Cafcas clearly narrows the gap between those who
would require control as the basis for a fiduciary duty and those who argue

41. See discussion supra note 6.
42. 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
43. See, e.g., A. W. Chesterton Co., Inc. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997);
Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849
(Mass. 1988); Smith v. Atlantic Prop., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Wilson
v. Jennings, 184 N.E.2d 642 (Mass. 1962); cf.Rodriguez v. Montalvo, 649 F. Supp. 1169
(D.P.R. 1986), affid 871 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1989).
44. 699 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 683; Jaffe Comm. Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
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that the nature of the "close corporation" justifies a shareholder's fiduciary
duty.
In any event, the general rule has been sufficiently developed by case
decisions to establish that the fiduciary duty will not depend on shareholder
control, but rather arises out of the nature of a closely held corporation. It
is reasonable to assume that because the fiduciary duty arises out of the
corporation's nature, those jurisdictions that have imposed the duty on
majority shareholders in those closely held corporations that are "close
corporations" would apply the same duty to any other shareholders in such
corporations when the facts justifying that result are presented. However,
it remains to be decided whether the shareholder-fiduciary rule ultimately
will be extended to apply to shareholders in all closely held corporations
because of the mutual dependence of shareholders in such corporations, and
not just to close corporations because of their factual similarity to partnerships.
VI. DEFINITION OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
When shareholders owe a partner-like fiduciary duty to their corporation and the other shareholders under the shareholder-fiduciary rule, the best
(and frequently cited) definition of that duty is the one described for joint
venturers by then Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals
in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest
loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties .... Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior.47
This definition was adopted for shareholder-fiduciaries in a closely held
corporation which qualified as a "close corporation" in the Donahue
decision.4 8 In substance, although phrased differently, this also is the
standard recognized in Illinois.49 This clearly is a different, and in some
ways more demanding, standard of conduct than is required by the fiduciary
47. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). See also 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership §420
(1987) (describing the similar duty among partners); 29 Ill. L. & P. Partnership§71 (1957).
48. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975).
49. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). See also Tilley
v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ill. 1958); Jaffe Comm. Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Zokoych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
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duty which directors and officers owe to a corporation and its sharehold50
ers.

The heightened fiduciary duty owed by shareholders appears to be the
"Golden Rule" in a corporate setting or, perhaps more accurately but still
biblical, a rule to make each shareholder his brother or sister shareholder's
keeper. At the heart of this broad, somewhat vaguely defined standard is
the basic idea that in such an interdependent situation, a shareholder should
not seek a benefit at the expense of any of the other shareholders, this
obviously being a duty different from - and more demanding than - the
one generally owed by a controlling shareholder to other shareholders.
In addition to breaches of what is essentially a duty of loyalty, as
illustrated by a shareholder competing with his corporation in the Hagshenas
case, at least three other typical factual situations can be identified as
violations of the heightened fiduciary duty owed by shareholders in closely
held corporations, or at least in those that are "close corporations":
1. Unequal (disproportionate)treatment. Relief may be
obtained when a shareholder is shown to be deprived, by
action taken by other shareholders, of his or her proportionate share of the financial benefits generated by the
corporation.
2. Frustrationof reasonable expectations. Relief may be
obtained when it is shown that the reasonable expectations
of a shareholder with respect to his or her involvement in
the corporation have been blocked by action taken by
other shareholders.
3. Freeze out/squeeze out. Relief may be obtained when
it is shown that there is overbearing, heavy handed
conduct to literally force a particular shareholder out of
the corporation, by coercing the shareholder to sell his or

50. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).

The court stated, "We contrast this strict good faith standard with the somewhat less stringent
standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and stockholders of all corporations must adhere
.... " Id. at 515-16. While decisions in some states describe the fiduciary duty of
shareholders in a closely held corporation to be the same as the fiduciary duty of a corporate
director or officer, see, e.g., W & W Equipment Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991), and Bailey v. Vaughan, 359 S.E.2d 599, 605 (W. Va. 1987), the more common
rule is that such shareholders have the special, heightened fiduciary duty of partners. See
also Jessie v. Boynton, 361 N.E.2d 1267, 1273 (Mass. 1977) (taking another approach, the
court asserted that directors of a closely held corporation have a higher level of duty to the
corporation's shareholders).

1998]

THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION TRAP

her shares (usually at a disadvantageous price) or by
barring the shareholder's participation in the corporation
without a sale of shares.
The following sampling of the authorities illustrates the above three
categories. Admittedly, the three categories are rather arbitrarily selected
because typically the same factual situation could be placed in all three, or
at least two, of the categories. Which (if any) of the categories to
emphasize in a given case becomes a choice for the advocate in the first
instance, and then for the court.
A. UNEQUAL (DISPROPORTIONATE) TREATMENT

There is both logic and equity in the idea that partners, absent their
agreement to the contrary, should share in the benefits of their enterprise in
proportion to their ownership interests. This idea has taken hold under the
judicially-developed concept that shareholders in closely held corporations
(or at least those which are "close corporations") have a fiduciary duty to
each other.
For example, in Donahue, the leading shareholder-fiduciary duty
decision, the controlling shareholders were a family group that caused the
closely held corporation to purchase from their retired father sufficient of his
shares to reduce the family's shareholdings from eighty percent to a bare
majority. 5 1 After the corporation refused a minority shareholder's demand
that her shares be purchased at the same price and upon the same terms, the
minority shareholder sued. 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, reversing
the trial and appellate courts, ruled that the corporation either had to (1)
rescind the purchase from the father in the controlling shareholder group or
(2) purchase the minority shareholder's shares at the same price, saying:
The rule of equal opportunity in stock purchases by close
corporations provides equal access to these benefits [of
having the corporate funds available to provide a market
for the shares] for all stockholders. We hold that, in any
case in which the controlling stockholders have exercised
their power over the corporation to deny the minority such

51. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
52. Id. at 511.
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equal opportunity, the minority shall be entitled to
appropriate relief.53
While the holding expressly applies a fiduciary duty to a controlling
shareholder group, as previously noted, the court made it clear that the
partner-like fiduciary duty applies to all shareholders of a closely held
corporation (i.e., the duty arises out of the special nature of the corporation
rather than out of the control relationship).54 On similar facts, the same
result was reached under Ohio law in Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply,
Inc.55 and the same rule was applied under Florida law in Tillis v. United
6
Parts,Inc.5
In Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 57 three men had equal

shareholdings in a closely held corporation until the former wife of one of

the shareholders acquired half of his shares as a result of a divorce. A
course of conduct ensued which was an obvious attempt to freeze the
divorcee out of the corporation's affairs.58 She was not given notice of
shareholders' meetings.59 The other shareholders comprised the board of
directors and received directors' fees, one was paid to manage the corporation and their wives went to shareholders' meetings at the corporation's
expense; but she received neither dividends nor any other payment from the
corporation. 6° Also, the other shareholders made at least two offers to

53. Id. at 519. For a detailed discussion of the Donahue decision and the shareholderfiduciary concept therein, see Alan H. Farnsworth, Close Corporations- Rights and Duties
of Shareholders - Fiduciary Relationship Among Shareholders - Shareholders' Right of
Equal Opportunity to Participate in Corporate Purchase of its Own Stock for Corporate
Treasury, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 1008-1018 (1976). The "equal-opportunity" doctrine
more accurately should be called the "proportionate opportunity" doctrine.
54. See discussion infra part IV.
55. 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
56. 395 So.2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
57. 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980). This case involved the fiduciary duty owed to a
minority shareholder by directors, who collectively were controlling shareholders. The court
recognized the principle that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe a fiduciary duty
to the other shareholders. Id. at 276. Similarly, in a minority shareholder's suit against
directors and majority shareholders of a closely held corporation, charging the taking of a
corporate opportunity and an attempt to squeeze out the minority, the court ruled on the duty
owed by the directors without distinguishing between their duty and the duty owed by
shareholders in such a situation, referring simply to the "owners" of such an enterprise as
having the fiduciary relationship of partners. Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285
(Idaho 1986).
58. Id. at 272-73.
59. Id. at 272.
60. Id.
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acquire her shares at a price substantially less than their value. 6 The court
held that the payments made to the other shareholders (directors' fees,
manager's salary and payments of expenses of wives) should be analyzed
by the trial court to determine whether "some portion of these payments
[I]f so the excluded
might be characterized as constructive dividends ....
shareholder must participate equally in the payments received by other
shareholders. 6 2
B. FRUSTRATION OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

If the shareholders of a closely held corporation had reduced to a

formal agreement their expectations with respect to participating in the

corporation, the frustration of those expectations by deliberate action of
another shareholder would provide grounds for relief based on breach of

contract or interference with a contracted-for entitlement. The courts, in the

absence of a formal contract, in effect have sought to determine from the
circumstances the reasonable expectations of shareholders in closely held
corporations and have held that the frustration of those expectations, without
a valid business justification, is a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by
shareholders to each other. Typically, the concept of a fiduciary duty not

to frustrate the reasonable expectations of a shareholder arises in a factual

setting in which a shareholder's employment with the closely held
corporation is terminated without cause or the balance of voting power in
the corporation is disrupted.
Still another Massachusetts decision, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc.,63 is a leading case for the "frustration of reasonable expecta-

61. Id. at 272-73.
62. Id. at 277. See also Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986), aff'd 511 N.Y.S. 2d 776 (1987) involving a shareholder whose employment with the
closely held corporation had been terminated, where the court noted that compensation for
employment in lieu of dividends may be the expected return on investment for shareholders
in some situations:
Here, it is alleged that plaintiff was refused employment and deprived of his
compensation. In a close corporation, since dividends are often provided by means
of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the functional equivalent of the
denial of participation in dividends.
Also, in a case applying Massachusetts law, minority shareholders were awarded damages
to give them their fair share of financial benefits paid out by the corporation after finding
that excessive compensation had been paid to the majority shareholder and his family.
Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986).
63. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). The Wilkes decision is an example of a factual
situation fitting all three categories-unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations
and freeze out/squeeze out-that justify relief.
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tions" grounds for relief. Wilkes, a founder, minority shareholder, employee
and member of management of a closely held corporation, was not reelected as an officer and director, and his employment was terminated by the
other shareholders.' After describing this action as a "squeeze-out" of the
minority shareholder, the court went on to describe the grounds for relief,
"[B]y terminating a minority stockholder's employment or by severing him
from a position as an officer or director, the majority effectively frustrate the
minority stockholder's purposes in entering on the corporate venture and
also deny him an equal return on his investment. ' ,6 5 The court pointed out,
however, that if the termination of employment were for a valid business
reason, that would control and the termination would be justified:
[W]e must carefully analyze the action taken ....
It must be asked whether the controlling group can
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action
When an asserted business purpose for their action is
advanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to
minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same
legitimate objective could have been achieved through an
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's
interest. 66
The frustration of reasonable expectations also was grounds for relief
from a disruption of the balance of voting power among the shareholders of
a closely held corporation in Hallahan v. Haltom Corp.6 7 In this case, two
Hallahan brothers and two Thompson brothers had formed a corporation,
intending that the four of them would be equal shareholders. 68 Five
64. Id. at 659.
65. Id. at 662-63.

66. Id. at 663. A valid business reason for terminating employment overrides a claim

for frustration of reasonable expectations for continued employment. Michaud v. Morris, 603

So.2d 886 (Ala. 1992); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1979), aff'd 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1980). As suggested in the quoted
language in the Wilkes decision, where a valid business purpose is claimed to justify the
termination of employment, it may also have to be shown that the corporate objective could
not be achieved by a means less damaging to the shareholder's reasonable expectations.
Thus, in a case in which a recapitalization was challenged by minority shareholders as a
squeeze-out of their stock interests, the defendants showed a valid business purpose for the
recapitalization which accordingly was upheld when plaintiffs failed to show that the same
business objective could have been achieved by a less drastic alternative. Leader v. Hycor,
Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985).
67. 385 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
68. Id. at 1033.
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additional shares were issued to another Thompson brother in payment for
carpentry work, with the understanding that he would not actively participate
in the business.69 After the Thompsons used the additional shares to vote
to terminate the Hallahans' employment with the business, the latter sued.70
The trial court ruled that the additional Thompson shares had to be sold
back to the corporation, restoring the balance of power and giving both sets
of brothers the fifty percent ownership needed to seek relief under the
Massachusetts deadlock statute.7" The trial court's decision was upheld on
appeal.72 In its ruling, the appellate court said, "This restored the balance
of control among the Hallahans and the Thompsons which the trial judge
found the parties had envisioned and which they had a fiduciary duty to
each other to maintain. 73
Again, in Bodio v. Ellis, 74 the transfer by one shareholder to another
of shares sufficient to give the latter voting control of a closely held
corporation violated the transferor's fiduciary duties to the third shareholder,
who thereby had become a minority shareholder subject to the transferee's
control.75 The court determined, as a basis for its decision, that it was the
expectation of all of the shareholders that the two remaining shareholders
would be equal shareholders.76 So also, in Cressy v. Shannon Continental
Corp.,77 the court of appeals said that the trial court might have ordered the
two shareholders of an "incorporated partnership" to vote their shares, or to
sell shares to realign ownership, in order to preserve the fifty-fifty sharing
of control contemplated when the two started the corporation as equal
shareholders.78

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1035.

73. Id.
74. 513 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 1987). See also Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y.

1975)(involving disruption of ownership of stock in equal amounts that the shareholders in
a closely held corporation had come to expect, plus an unequal treatment favoring one
shareholder over another, without proper justification). In Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d
712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), a constructive trust was imposed to remedy a disruption of equal
stock ownership among family members who were the only shareholders in a closely held

corporation.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Bodio v. Ellis, 513 N.E.2d 684, 685 (Mass. 1987).
Id. at 688.
378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 945-46.
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C. FREEZE OUT/SQUEEZE OUT

"Freeze-out/squeeze-out" is an arbitrarily selected label for purposes of
this discussion to identify another type of breach of the fiduciary duty owed
by shareholders in closely held corporations for which courts will grant
relief. "Freeze-out" and "squeeze-out" are labels used in the case decisions
without identifying any clear difference in meaning between the two. For
purposes of this article, a "freeze-out/squeeze-out" is actionable conduct by
which a particular shareholder is excluded from, or severely limited in, his
or her participation in the financial benefits and other "partner attributes" of
shareholding in a closely held corporation, so as to destroy or drastically
impair the value of its stock ownership. Often, this ultimately is accompanied by an attempt to force the shareholder to sell its stock in the corporation, usually at a price favorable to the buyer.
The "freeze-out/squeeze-out" theory is not mutually exclusive of the
two other theories of relief, as previously mentioned. To the contrary,
unequal (disproportionate) treatment and frustration of reasonable expectations typically are involved in a freeze-out/squeeze-out. The difference, if
there is one, may be one of degree. A freeze-out/squeeze-out typically is
oppressive conduct on a scale designed to achieve a benefit for one
shareholder or shareholder group, at the expense of another shareholder
caught in a closely held corporation trap, by literally or constructively
forcing the trapped shareholder out of the corporation.
The following examples illustrate freeze-out/squeeze-outs. In Evans v.
Blesi,79 Evans and Blesi shared equal ownership of a corporation until
Blesi, by intimidating tactics, caused Evans to transfer one share to Blesi,
giving Blesi control. Subsequently, Blesi, again by intimidating tactics,
obtained Evans' consent to eliminate cumulative voting for directors, as well
as Evans' resignation as a director, officer and employee."0 Evans,
however, shortly after his resignation, consulted counsel who sent a notice
revoking Evans' resignations and consent."' Blesi nevertheless refused to
pay Evans a salary or his annual bonus, and refused to make payments to
Evans' pension plan account. 2 Evans sued for damages.8 3 Blesi's
abrasive and intimidating conduct was held to be a violation of the fiduciary
duty he owed to Evans as a "partner" in a closely held corporation and

79. 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).

80. Id. at 778.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Evans was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages for the freezeout/squeeze-out. 4
Comolli v. Comolli 5 involved a corporation owned by three brothers.
After serving in the positions for almost twenty years, Felix, the oldest, was
removed as a director, president and general manager by his two younger
brothers, Louis and Marco. 6 Upon Marco's death, his widow sold twenty
of Marco's shares to Louis, but because Louis did not have the money to
purchase the remaining shares, Louis caused the corporation to purchase the
remainder of Marco's shares to prevent Felix from purchasing them. 7 The
Georgia Supreme Court held that to avoid a corporate participation in the
continued freeze out of Felix, "good faith requires the directors to authorize
a corporate purchase of Felix' stock at the same price and the same terms
given to the other shareholder. In the event the corporation is not legally
authorized to do so, or elects not to do so, the corporate purchase of [the
other shareholder's] stock was invalid. This will eliminate any question of
a preferential distribution of assets .... , Obviously, this could stand as
an "unequal opportunity" case, but it also involves a long course of conduct,
capped by the stock purchase, amounting to an example of a long-term
situation constituting a freeze-out/squeeze-out.
In Loy v. Lorm Corp., 9 the court reversed the directed verdict of the
trial court and remanded the case for submission to the jury of the question
whether the majority group of shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to
Loy, as the fourth of four shareholders of a closely held corporation
involved in a restaurant business. Holding that the majority shareholders
owed a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder, it was a question for the
jury whether that duty was breached by a systematic freeze out/squeeze out
The freeze out/squeeze out allegedly
of the minority shareholder.9"
corporation's restaurant for premises
the
charged
to
involved (1) high rents
and equipment leased to the corporation by the majority owners' separate
leasing corporation, (2) refusing to buy out plaintiff's stock while selling the
corporation's restaurant for no consideration to another party who continued
the restaurant under another name, and (3) selling the stock in the leasing

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 780.
246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978).
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
278 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 903.
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corporation to the purchaser of the restaurant for $300,000 (as contrasted
with no payment for the restaurant itself).9'
In Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp.,92 the holder of 42.35% of the
outstanding shares contested an additional stock offering to existing
shareholders at prices allegedly below market. The purpose of the offering,
the contesting shareholder claimed, was to impair his interest in the
corporation and force him out of the corporation on management's terms.93
The court held that a lawful procedure, done for improper purposes, is
actionable.9 4 In this case, summary judgment was denied defendants
because, even though plaintiff was offered a pro rata participation in the
offering, the offering allegedly was at below market prices, thus depriving
plaintiff of his choice not to buy.95 If he did not buy, he would be
financially diluted; if he did buy, he would still be trapped to an illiquid,
non-transferable, non-dividend paying minority interest. In other words, the
offering was a freeze-out/squeeze-out in progress.
Similarly, in Biltmore Motor Corp. v. Roque,96 two shareholders
acquired additional original issue shares at prices fixed below fair market
value. This raised their share ownership from sixty percent to ninety-five
percent in a closely held corporation while reducing plaintiff to a five
percent share ownership (from his previous forty percent), causing plaintiff
to suffer substantial economic dilution from the below-market sale price of
the additional shares. 97 Previously, plaintiff had been forced to resign as
an officer and director of the corporation when he refused to sell his shares
to the other shareholders at a price considerably below fair market value.98
The court held that the sale of shares was for the purpose of ousting the
plaintiff from the corporation, and should be rescinded. 99 In other words,
it was part of an invalid freeze-out/squeeze-out effort.
In Corbin v. Corbin,'° a father sold his shares in a family corporation in equal amounts to sons Mark and Peter in exchange for their
agreements to pay him a monthly annuity. Mark, who was president and
managed the corporation, bought shares from another brother with corporate
91.
92.
Nixon v.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 901.
99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953). Query: Would this case be decided differently after
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993)? See discussion supra note 12.
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239.
Id at 240.
291 So.2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied 303 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1974).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 116.
429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
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funds, giving Mark a controlling share interest and leaving Peter with a
minority interest.' 0 ' Mark then caused the corporation to stop paying
dividends, which Peter had relied upon to make the annuity payments he
owed his father."° Since this was a subchapter S corporation, corporate
income was attributed Peter for income tax purposes with no distribution
from the corporation to provide funds for payment of the taxes. 10 3 This
was coupled with both Mark's effort to purchase Peter's shares and a written
admission by Mark that he intended to freeze out Peter."° The court, in
issuing a temporary restraining order to prohibit the termination of
customary dividend payments, found that "[t]he obvious intent and desired
result . . . is to make Peter's stock valueless in Peter's hands, thereby
forcing him to sell it to Mark."'0 5 In other words, a systematic process
constituting a freeze-out/squeeze-out.
VII. THE SHAREHOLDER FIDUCIARY RULE AS A COMPLEMENT TO
STATUTORY REMEDIAL PROVISIONS

The shareholder-fiduciary doctrine developed in equity to provide relief
where the need was not satisfied by remedies at law. The end result that
has emerged is that the remedies in equity complement the statutory
remedial provisions for shareholders, i.e., the relief available "at law." This
remains true even though in many jurisdictions, there have been improvements in the statutory remedial provisions, changing the thresholds for relief
or broadening the range of statutorily authorized remedies, or both.
Many state corporation statutes, particularly those patterned on the
Model Business CorporationAct or the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, permit a court, in its discretion, upon petition by a shareholder, to grant
dissolution or other statutorily prescribed remedies when those in control of
a corporation are guilty of "oppressive" conduct." The lack of any clear
definition of what is "oppressive"' 7 obviously gives the courts a flexible
101. Id. at 277.
102. Id. at 277-78.

103. Id. at 279.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 280.
106. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 14.30(2)(ii), 14.34 (1996).
107. See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1960) (defining
"oppressive" as not involving "an essential inference of imminent disaster" and not requiring
"#mismanagement, or misapplication of assets,"' nor is it "synonymous with 'illegal' and
'fraudulent'," but merely cumulative conduct by those in control to exclude the other
shareholders from having a voice in corporate affairs.) See also David F. Rolewick, Proving
oppression of the minority shareholders: chancery relief in shareholderdisputes, 37 ISBA
CORP. & SEc. 1, 2 (Oct. 1991).
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tool for dealing with various internal problems, just as the shareholderfiduciary rule has done.
As it has developed, the facts that would result in equitable relief under
the shareholder-fiduciary rule in many cases would also constitute "oppressive" conduct for purposes of the remedial statutory provisions. For
example, frustration of the reasonable expectations of a shareholder in a
closely held corporation also can constitute oppression for purposes of
corporation statutes that authorize court-ordered dissolution or other relief
on such grounds.'0 8 To illustrate the point, the analysis in Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,'09 that frustration of reasonable expectations for continued employment with a closely held corporation was grounds
for relief based on breach of fiduciary duty owed to that shareholder, is
substantially the same as the analysis in the New York case of In re Kemp
& Beatley, Inc.,"1 where the statutory concept of "oppressive actions" was
construed to include frustration of reasonable expectations of a minority
shareholder for continued employment by a closely held corporation."'
While the statutory provisions allowing relief for "oppressive" conduct
have been important to the closely held corporation trap problem, other
improvements of importance have been made with respect to such statutes
by legislative and judicial action. For example, some statutes, in addition
to authorizing the remedy of dissolution or other specified remedies,
authorize courts in general terms to provide such other relief as is appropriate to the situation, thereby authorizing the exercise of equity powers in
such situations to the full extent possible under the shareholder-fiduciary

108. For discussions of "oppression," see Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's
Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. L. 699, 711-18 (1993); David F. Rolewick, Proving
oppression of the minority shareholders: chancery relief in shareholderdisputes, 37 ISBA
CORP. & SEC. 1 (Oct. 1991); ProtectingMinority Shareholdersin Close Corporationsfrom
ShareholderOppression, 31 CORP. J. 238, 243 (Autumn, 1991); Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Close
CorporationShareholder Reasonable Expectations, The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 41, 51 (1987).
109. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
110. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). See also Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929
(Mont. 1982) (discussing the frustration of reasonable expectations as supporting an order for

statutory dissolution).

111. See also Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (referring to the

standards under the fiduciary concept being substantially the same as for statutory
"oppression" and indicating that the availability of statutory remedies for oppression does not
preclude the award of damages for oppressive conduct, i.e., relief for breach of fiduciary
duty, rather than for the statutory offense of oppression).
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rule.' 12 In some jurisdictions which do not have such statutory authorization, the courts rely upon inherent powers to provide remedies not statutorily
authorized." 3
A difference between the equity and statutory rules is that unlike the
shareholder-fiduciary rule, the offending party or group must be in control
under statutes based on the Model Acts. On the other hand, under the
shareholder-fiduciary rule, relief is only available to shareholders in a "close
corporation" (or possibly in any closely held corporation) while the statutory
remedial provisions may not be limited to such corporations. Finally,
"oppressive" conduct under the statutory provisions probably is not as broad
a basis for relief as the fiduciary duty under the shareholder-fiduciary rule
(although the case law ultimately may develop to make the two synonymous
or virtually so).
VII. CONCLUSION
A. A LOOK BACK

The rule that shareholders in closely held corporations - or at least
those that are specially defined in this article as "close corporations"- have
the heightened fiduciary duty of partners has given the courts a reach into
the shareholders' trap problem in closely held corporations, and a flexibility
of remedy, generally not available under corporation remedial statutes
4
dealing with deadlock, oppression and other misconduct of shareholders."
As pointed out by a leading authority on the topic, "[t]he traditional
corporate norms, oriented as they are toward publicly held corporations,

112. For example, the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 now authorizes a list
of remedies available in a court proceeding, which for non-public corporations range from
court ordered dissolution to the thirteenth category which is "other legal and equitable
remedies." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(b) and (c)(West 1983) (amended
1994)(emphasis added.) See also Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992);
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
113. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1984); Maschmeier v.
Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 50.7 P.2d 387 (Ore. 1973).
114. In Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F.Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Pa. 1984), the court, with
a touch of naivete, declared: "We find ourselves struck by the unavailability or inadequacy
of identifiable legal remedies to aid minority shareholders in redressing abuses by majority
shareholders equipped with unfettered power over the management of the close corporation."
The comment applies with equal validity to all abuses of shareholders in closely held
corporations, not limited to those in a majority-minority relationship.
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proved unsuitable for close corporations . . . ."1'
The shareholderfiduciary rule has been judicially developed out of the need for relief, based
on the special nature of closely held corporations. It is a classic example
of equity developing relief to fill a need left unsatisfied by remedies at law,
and doing so in keeping with the well-recognized way of extending a rule
based on factual analogy. Even as advances have occurred in the statutory
law, broadening the basis for relief and increasing the types of relief
available at law, the shareholder-fiduciary rule has continued to serve a
complementary role with respect to the statutory provisions.
B. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

Because the shareholder-fiduciary rule is beneficial in its purpose, it
should be fostered rather than curbed. Where legislative action is proposed
for closely held corporations, it should be directed at improving or
completing the development of the rule, rather than destroying it, as was
proposed in Illinois. The special needs of closely held corporations derive
from the special nature of those corporations, a fact so often mentioned in
the authorities and so frequently ignored by the critics of the rule." 6
The shareholder-fiduciary rule is by no means a finished or perfect
concept. Further evolution and improvement by case decision or legislation,
or both, will be needed. For progress by legislative action, a change of
approach seems necessary. For example, there must be recognition that
closely held corporations have special circumstances necessitating "remedies" not based on fault and, optimally, not requiring a legal proceeding,
with its time and expense, to allow any shareholder in a closely held
corporation the remedy of withdrawing, after adequate notice or other
protection for the other shareholders, unless the shareholder has expressly
agreed in advance not to exercise the withdrawal right. Less radical
improvements, whether by legislation or court decision, would further define
and refine the shareholder-fiduciary rule. Some obvious points yet to be
dealt with are as follows:
1. As discussed supra part IV, In What Kind of Corporations Does
The Shareholder-Fiduciary Rule Apply, many cases which focus on this
question indicate that the rule applies only to "close corporations," specially
defined as incorporated partnerships in which the shareholders are involved

115.

F.H. O'NEAL & R. B. THOMPSON,

O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY

SHAREHOLDERS §7.02 at 6 (2nd ed. 1992).
116. Id., and in addition to many of the authorities previously cited herein, see F. Hodge
O'Neal, Close Corporations:Existing Legislation andRecommended Reform, 33 Bus. L. 873
(1978).
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in management and operations. This definition justified the application in
a corporate context of the fiduciary duty owed by partners to each other and
their partnership-a concept derived from the law of agency and applied
because each partner in effect is an agent for the other partners of the
partnership. However, the need for relief for shareholders caught in a
closely held corporation trap is not limited to such so-called "close
corporations." It remains to be determined whether the shareholder-fiduciary
rule eventually will be made applicable to all closely held corporations,
based on the interdependence of the shareholders due to the lack of a market
for their shares, carrying on the tradition of equity providing relief when a
need exists for which relief is not available at law.
2. Under partnership law, the fiduciary duty owed by partners cannot
be destroyed by contract." 7 So long as the shareholder-fiduciary rule is
based on the borrowing of partnership concepts of fiduciary duty, under the
foregoing rule to what degree can a contract among shareholders be
effective to modify - or even eliminate - some aspects of the fiduciary
duty of shareholders? For example, would an exculpation from monetary
liability or an indemnification provision be vulnerable to an attack? It
remains to be decided, but the answer, if derived from partnership law, may
be "yes."
3. Can a remedy for frustration of expectations be provided to any
but the original shareholders? There is authority that protected expectations
can accrue to those who are not initial investors in a closely held corporation," 8 but more decisions on that point will be needed before that can be
said to be firmly a part of the shareholder-fiduciary rules.
Finally, attorneys representing shareholders in closely held corporations
need to educate their clients as to the rule and to be thorough when dealing
with a claim that a shareholder's heightened fiduciary duty has been
breached. For example, the validity of the shareholder-fiduciary concept
needs to be anticipated when litigation is initiated and all defenses
(including possible violations of plaintiffs fiduciary duties to bar its
117. Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d 755, 760 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Labovitz v. Dolan,
App. Ct. 1989). However, there are decisions indicating that
545 N.E.2d 304 (I11.
shareholders' agreements or other evidence may show that the shareholders did not intend
a partner-like relationship, thereby negating a shareholder fiduciary duty based on that
concept in a closely held corporation. See, e.g., A. Teixeira & Co., Inc. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d
1383 (R.I. 1997). A similar end result is achieved by decisions holding that termination of
employment or stock repurchases made in accordance with a preexisting shareholders'
agreement do not violate the shareholder-fiduciary rule. See, e.g., Blank v. Chelmsford
OB/GYN, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Mass. 1995).
118. See, e.g., Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985).
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entitlement to relief in equity) need to be asserted. By doing these things,
complaints as to the results and burden of the rule should be minimized if
not eliminated.

